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Cyber threat intelligence sharing has become a focal point for many organizations to improve resilience against cyberattacks.
The objective lies in sharing relevant information achieved through automating as many processes as possible without losing
control or compromising security. The intelligence may be crowdsourced from decentralized stakeholders to collect and enrich
existing information. Trust is an attribute of actionable cyber threat intelligence that has to be established between stakeholders.
Sharing information about vulnerabilities requires a high level of trust because of the sensitive information. Some threat intelligence
platforms/providers support trust establishment through internal vetting processes; others rely on stakeholders to manually build
up trust. The latter may reduce the amount of intelligence sources. This work presents a novel trust taxonomy to establish a
trusted threat sharing environment. 30 popular threat intelligence platforms/providers were analyzed and compared regarding trust
functionalities. Trust taxonomies were analyzed and compared. Illustrative case studies were developed and analyzed applying our
trust taxonomy.
1. Introduction
Cyber intelligence is of high valuewhen it comes tomitigating
threats and, if shared, can contribute to thwarting repeated
attacks. To accelerate the process of system hardening, cyber
intelligence has to be actionable; i.e., it has to be complete,
timely, accurate, relevant [1], and trustworthy to stakeholders.
There are two types of cyber threat intelligence (CTI):
strategic and tactical [2]. Actionable cyber intelligence should
not need further analysis; it contains all information needed
to understand the vulnerability and to take immediate action.
Many organizations are ready to share their threat intelligence
but insufficient threat sharing models and collaboration
platforms hinder the process [3]. Yet, small organizations are
especially incapable of analyzing and producing good enough
quality CTI. Current industry-focused collaborations such
as the Financial Sector (FS-ISAC: https://www.fsisac.com),
the Retail Sector (R-CISC: https://r-cisc.org), the Electricity
Sector (E-ISAC: https://www.eisac.com), and the recently
established Automotive Sector (AUTO-ISAC: https://www
.automotiveisac.com) are sharing cyber threat intelligence
mainly in a manual and supervised fashion [4, 5]. In particu-
lar, FS-ISAC represents a community of trust that continually
collects, analyzes, vets, and disseminates relevant threat intel-
ligence to its participating members around the globe. Upon
user authentication, the Critical Infrastructure Notification
System (CINS) allows the FS-ISAC to distribute security
threats and alerts to multiple recipients. This is manually
done through a web portal on a “pull” basis. Furthermore,
FS-ISAC does not allow to share received information with
stakeholders outside the community. The detection of such
a breach could result in being fined and dismissed from the
community.
Furthermore, Internet of Things (IoT) vulnerabilities are
a new challenge in the sharing environment where informa-
tion about products, i.e., hardware, is exchanged additionally
to traditional IT infrastructure vulnerabilities. The sharing
in this domain is still very low and few sources provide
information about such vulnerabilities. One of the reasons
may be the recent emergence of connected cars, household
items, or medical devices to the Internet and the therefore
resulting low sources of threat intelligence. Moreover, the
complexity of the components and its attributes render it
challenging for companies to provide relevant inventory
lists. These are required to know which information is
relevant.
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Crowd and supply chain sourcing models are also
bringing in environments where trust naturally emerges.
TripAdvisor and Wikipedia are perhaps the crowdsourcing
industry’s best known names. Crowdsourcing models are
also supporting risk management strategies, e.g., by enabling
companies to communicate transportation timelines, severe
weather, and manufacturing interruptions, for instance, and
allowing real-time collaboration between suppliers and other
stakeholders [6–8]. The Synack Crowd Security Intelligence
(https://www.synack.com) provides a hacker powered secu-
rity platform with focus on crowdsourced penetration test-
ing, vulnerability orchestration, analytics, and risk reporting.
The solution was launched in May 2013 and provides a
network of hundreds of vetted and trusted cyber security
researchers and engineerswho aremade available for ongoing
security testing at scale to clients for vulnerability remedia-
tion on an ongoing subscription.
In the case of supply chain based trusted environments,
the information and know-how sharing between the partners
certainly enhances the chain performance [7, 9]. Further-
more, collaborative data management and analytics tools
have come a long way in helping data fit into data warehouses
and business intelligence environments as well as providing a
full range of collaboration features [10]. Indeed, collaborative
cloud-based solutions not only have the potential to enable
better teamwork, stakeholder engagement, and productivity,
but also come up with powerful file storing and sharing
capabilities and customized dashboards for better visibility
into the entire supply chain management, for example.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
related work. Section 3 presents a comparison of threat intel-
ligence platforms focusing on trust. Section 4 presents, dis-
cusses, and compares the trust taxonomy. Section 5 presents,
analyzes, and evaluates our case studies. Section 6 concludes
our work.
2. Related Work
Different suggestions of what threat intelligence is have been
published. That is, a survey from the Ponemon Institute
revealed that timeliness, ability to prioritize, implementa-
tion, and trust in source were amongst the most impor-
tant attributes of actionable cyber threat intelligence to
participants [11]. The European Network and Information
Security Agency (ENISA) suggests actionability as accuracy,
ingestibility, completeness, relevance, trustworthiness, and
timeliness [12]. According to these two sources, trust estab-
lishment in CTI sharing is a crucial attribute to build long-
lasting relationships amongst stakeholders. Sharing threat
intelligence may include revealing that an organization was
breached [13]. Reference [14] defines trust as one of the most
crucial obstacles to share CTI amongst stakeholders. Trust
in cyber threat intelligence sharing has been addressed by
the Mitre group with its sharing protocol Trusted Automated
eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII: https://oasis-
open.github.io/cti-documentation/taxii/intro). TAXII, based
on HTTPS, shares indicators and uses the Structured Threat
Information Exchange (STIX: https://oasis-open.github.io/
cti-documentation/stix/intro), inter alia, to share CTI. The
producing stakeholder (TAXII client) shares his threat intel-
ligence over a TAXII server with other TAXII clients. STIX
has become the forefront runner for the description of cyber
threat intelligence in the past few years; nevertheless, it has
been found to be challenging to implement and use by
practitioners. The Malware Information Sharing Platform
(MISP: https://github.com/MISP/MISP) provides another
format to describe indicators and offers a plug-in for cyber
threat intelligence in the STIX format. The Vocabulary for
Event Recording and Incident Sharing Framework (VERIS:
http://veriscommunity.net, https://github.com/vz-risk/veris)
is a language to describe security incidents in a structured
form. Reference [15] presents a threat intelligence framework
that aims to create situational awareness amongst cyber
security teams. The work includes a detailed analysis about
trust in cyber threat intelligence sharing, such as the different
trustmodels, i.e., “Validated Trust”, “Direct Historical Trust”,
“Mediated Trust”, “Mandated Trust”, and “Hybrid Trust”.
Trust is related to the transmission between stakeholders, i.e.,
that the sharing and consuming stakeholders are the intended
participants. Moreover, the authors define another trust
attribute as “confidence” in threat intelligence. Reference [12]
describes trust related not only to the sharing stakeholder,
but also to where the threat intelligence is coming from.This
requires a continuous path of transparency. Reference [16]
published a threat taxonomy where one attribute describes
the threat to information sharing with unauthorized stake-
holders. This may have negative outcomes, depending on
the secrecy labeling of the information. For instance, sharing
groups may expel the stakeholder or fines may be issued.
Reference [17] advises stakeholders in the preparation of
enabling a trust mechanism for information sharing, such as
nondisclosure agreements, Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) (TLP
is defined into four colors, namely, white (no restrictions),
green (sharing with peers and partners, not publicly), amber
(sharing only inside own organization onwho-need-to-know
basis), and red (no sharing)), and antitrust rules.
According to the literature, trust is one of the most
challenging attributes of cyber threat intelligence sharing.
Without it, decentralized cyber threat intelligence sharing
would be unthinkable. According to the Oxford Dictionary,
trust is defined as “a firm belief in the reliability, truth, ability,
or strength of someone or something.” We define trust as an
assurance that stakeholders are treating received CTI with
confidentiality, if applicable, and not using it for malicious
purposes. Furthermore, stakeholders are sharing true and
correct CTI without the intending to badmouth or harm
another peer in any way.
3. Analysis of Threat Intelligence
Platforms regarding Trust
The process of aiding stakeholders to establish trust man-
ually or automatically through trust taxonomies, or other
support, is limited in the analyzed threat intelligence plat-
form/providers. The focus mainly lies in sharing indicators
and visualizing them in a graphical interface. The majority
of the platforms provide an internal vetting process which
leaves the responsibility to the provider. Hence, the provider
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Table 1: Threat intelligence platforms: 1denotes direct access; 2denotes white/gray literature.
Threat Intelligence Platforms Trust Links
Malware Information Sharing Platform
(MISP)1 𝑇2 https://github.com/MISP/MISP
















IBM X-Force Exchange1 𝑇
2
https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com
Alien Vault OpenThreat Exchange (OTX)1 𝑇
2
https://www.alienvault.com
Anomali Threat Stream (STAXX)2 𝑇
2
https://www.anomali.com/platform/threatstream


























Last Quarter Mile Toolset (LQMT)2 𝑇
1
https://cfm.gss.anl.gov/lqmt/
Health Information Trust Alliance - Cyber
Threat XChange (CTX)2 𝑇1 https://hitrustalliance.net/cyber-threat-xchange/
Defense Security Information Exchange2 𝑇
1
https://www.dsie.org
Retail Cyber Intelligence Sharing Center
(R-CISC) Intelligence Sharing Portal2 𝑇2 https://r-cisc.org
Accenture Cyber Intelligence Platform2 𝑇
1
https://www.accenture.com/gb-en/service-cyber-defense-solutions































and its vetting processes have to be fully understood and
trusted. This does not leave any room to establish circles
of trust with decentralized peers. For instance, threat intel-
ligence may be very limited if it is only shared in small
circles. Therefore, a wide range of connected stakeholders
is desirable. This enables participants to use threat sensors
globally; i.e., each stakeholder enables threat monitoring and
detection systems; the results are automatically consumed
by all members. Table 1 provides an analysis of 30 threat
intelligence platforms/providers which have been evaluated
according to trust functionalities. The evaluation methods
consisted of testing the platforms (direct access) and the anal-
ysis of white/gray literature. Platform testing was conducted
by installing the newest version on virtual boxes or signing
up with the web applications where possible. The white/gray
literature consisted of academic papers, reports, andmanuals
provided online. Platforms labeled with 𝑇
1
establish trust
internally for the stakeholder. Platforms labeled with 𝑇
2
provide no previously established trust environment and





and provide a trusted environment
for stakeholders but also allow manual connections to other
peers and repositories outside the trusted environment.
21 service providers establish trust for stakeholders (𝑇
1
)
through vetting processes and closed environments such as
hidden groups or sharing only with specific stakeholders.
Some platforms provide intelligence to the stakeholder with-
out having to reciprocate or connect to other stakeholders
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Table 2: Threat intelligence platform matrix.
Threat Intelligence Platform Own CTI External Sources Vetting Process Same Industry No Stakeholder contact
Malware Information Sharing Platform
(MISP) ∙





IBM X-Force Exchange ∙
Alien Vault OpenThreat Exchange (OTX) ∙
Anomali Threat Stream (STAXX) ∙
LookingGlass Scout Prime (Cyveillance) ∙ ∙
Cisco Talos ∙ ∙
Crowd Strike Falcon Platform ∙ ∙
Norm Shield ∙ ∙
ServiceNow-Bright Point Security ∙ ∙
NECOMAtter (NECOMAtome) ∙
Recorded Future ∙ ∙
CyberConnector ∙ ∙
Last Quarter Mile Toolset (LQMT) ∙ ∙
Health Information Trust Alliance - Cyber
Threat XChange (CTX) ∙ ∙
Defense Security Information Exchange ∙
Retail Cyber Intelligence Sharing Center
(R-CISC) Intelligence Sharing Portal ∙ ∙
Accenture Cyber Intelligence Platform ∙ ∙
Anubis Networks Cyberfeed ∙ ∙
Comilion ∙
McAfee Threat Intelligence Exchange ∙ ∙
ThreatQuotient ∙ ∙ ∙
ThreatTrackThreatIQ ∙ ∙ ∙
Eclectic IQ ∙ ∙ ∙
InfobloxThreat Intelligence Data Exchange ∙ ∙
Cyber-security Information Sharing
Partnership ∙
through the platform. Nine platforms require the stakeholder
to manually establish trust with other peers or groups (𝑇
2
).
There is no identified mechanism that supports automated
trust establishment in any of the analyzed threat intelligence





environment and manual connections to other stakeholders
and cyber threat intelligence feeds.
Table 2 provides an overview of which platforms produce
their own CTI, whether they allow external sources to flow
into the TIP, if an internal vetting process is in place, whether
they only share inside the same industry, and whether
collaboration with other stakeholders is allowed.
3.1. Summary. This research has shown that various plat-
forms enable internal vetting processes to establish a trusted
environment, but they do not allow external connections.
This creates a limitation of cyber threat intelligence sources.
The trend as seen in Figure 1 shows that most of the tested
threat intelligence platforms chose to provide cyber threat
intelligence directly to their stakeholders without enabling
direct contact to others. Roughly a third of the tested plat-
forms decided to only provide manual trust establishment.
That is, stakeholders have to develop trust relationships
manually. Only 4 platforms enabled the manual connections
between stakeholders or to external threat intelligence feeds
alongside their vetted cyber threat intelligence. The used
processes to establish trust aremostly vetting processes which
are not transparent for users to see. Hence, stakeholders
have to fully trust the threat intelligence provider with its
processes.
Threat intelligence platforms should provide a more
rigorous trust evaluation model, in particular, when the



















Figure 1: Trust establishment.
platform enables stakeholder interaction. Free platforms,
such as AlienVault and IBM X-Force Exchange, allow par-
ticipation with a valid e-mail and password. These vetting
processes are not sufficient when sharing information about
vulnerabilities.Malicious peersmay create profiles tomonitor
current threat intelligence discussions which could tip off
an adversary’s attack. Moreover, a malicious peer could feed
false information into the cyber threat intelligence ecosystem
which could occupy stakeholders with the verification of the
fake information. This may be used to distract stakeholders
from real threats.
4. Trust Taxonomy
Trust plays a critical role in sharing cyber threat intelligence.
Trusted relationships foster confidence for stakeholders that
the provided information will be acted upon as intended, for
instance, that stakeholders do no harm with the knowledge
of vulnerabilities, especially if they have not been remedied
yet and, furthermore, that stakeholders have appropriate
protection measures in place and share the information
as indicated. In this regard, understanding the value each
actor contributes to the exchange is key. Identifying the
membership criteria for any information sharing effort helps
to build transparency and trust from day one.
Trust taxonomies have been widely investigated, such as
for P2P systems, for instance [18–21], to establish both cen-
tralized and decentralized secure environments. Moreover,
the 5x5x5 scheme (the 5x5x5 scheme evaluates intelligence in
3 areas: source, data validity, and sensitivity; each evaluation
has 5 possible types of grading) and Admiralty Code (the
Admiralty Code evaluates the reliability of the source and
the confidence in the information) have appeared in recent
platforms to evaluate intelligence. Section 4.3 presents a
comparison of the aforementioned trust taxonomies and our
trust taxonomy.
Figure 2 depicts our trust taxonomy processes to establish
a trusted environment between centralized and decentralized
stakeholders. Every stakeholder has its own profile which
shows the sharing activity, peer ratings from poor to excel-
lent, Mitre’s Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE:
https://cve.mitre.org/index.html) number, the source, and
the industry group. Mitre’s CVE is a dictionary of publicly
known cyber security vulnerabilities that can also be used
to correlate new indicators with historic events. Stakeholders
can submit new potential security vulnerabilities which are
then listed on the CVE website. The approval process is
overseen by the CVE board. To elaborate further on the
profile attribute sharing, we set our parameter to very active
= 10 or more; active = 1–9; inactive = 0 shared threat records
per month. Even though the activity does not automatically
reflect good quality CTI, it is nevertheless a trust attribute.
The stakeholder rating borrows its functionality from
eBay and Amazon’s peer review after purchase. Buyers can
rate sellers after purchase and vice versa. In our model, the
stakeholders are rated manually from poor to excellent and
the rating is based on the quality, or actionability, of threat
intelligence (relevance, completeness, and timeliness). The
threat intelligence and source define the type and origin, for
example, whether the sharer is also the producer (1), someone
else (2), or unknown (3). The industry column shows the
affiliated industry group, if any, and can contribute to the
trust level by being part of a respected group. For instance,
organization A is part of the Financial Sector (FS-ISAC).
The trust balance chart shows how much value each
column has. Our system’s parameters are set to have sharing
activity as 9%, stakeholder rating as 36%, same source 18%,
and same industry as 37% weight. The reasoning behind the
values is shown in Table 3.
We combine these inputs to help decentralized stake-
holders to establish incipient trust. The parameters (sharing
activity, stakeholder rating, same source, and same industry)
are adjustable to stakeholder preferences. The rating value
depicts the amount of each rating attribute pertaining to our
trust balance. An organization must score at least 70% (this
threshold is defined by our personal acceptance level andmay
be modified to suit individual stakeholders) to be considered
trusted according to our personal trust acceptance level.
(i) Scenario 1:OrganizationA is very active (9%) andhas
an excellent stakeholder rating (36%); the industry is
the same (37%); nevertheless, the shared cyber threat
intelligence source is unknown (5.94%). According
to our personalized trust balance parameters, the
organization has a complete score of 87.94% and is
thus accepted.
(ii) Scenario 2: Organization B is active (4.5%) but has
a poor stakeholder rating (7.2%); the source of the
threat intelligence is the sharing stakeholder itself
(18%), and it is the same industry (37%).Theorganiza-
tion has a final score of 47.7% and is therefore rejected.
4.1. Trust Analysis. Trust in threat intelligence platforms
(TIPs) is mostly established through a vetting process con-
ducted by the CTI vendor. Some platforms use a recommen-
dation system where a trusted peer may recommend another
one as seen in the UK based Cyber Security Information
Sharing Partnership (CiSP: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cisp).
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Table 3: Attribute reasoning.
Attribute Value Reasoning
Sharing Activity 9% The number of CTI contributions may not be a direct indicator for trust. Nevertheless, the activity may signalthe stakeholder whether someone is a free-rider or actively interested in a collaboration.
Stakeholder Rating 36%
The rating of the stakeholder received a higher contribution to the overall trust because other stakeholders may
evaluate the peer’s trustworthiness based on the quality of the information and the conduct after receiving the
information, i.e., whether the stakeholder conformed to secrecy labeling.
Same Source 18%
Transparency regarding where the intelligence comes from is a valuable contribution to the overall trust result,
for instance, whether the sharing stakeholder also produced the intelligence or forwarded it from another
unknown source.
Same Industry 37% The same industry parameter received the highest value of all four attributes. Being inside the same industrysector, i.e., finance, retail, or manufacturing, automatically increases the trust amongst stakeholders.
Stakeholder Sharing Stakeholder Rating Threat Intelligence and Source Industry
Organization A Very Active Excellent ∗∗∗∗∗ CVE-XXXX-XXX / Unknown (3) Finance
Organization B Active Poor ∗ CVE-XXXX-XXX / Stakeholder (1) Retail
Organization C Active Good ∗∗∗ CVE-XXXX-XXX / Organization F (2) N/A
Organization D Active Very Good ∗∗∗∗ CVE-XXXX-XXX / Organization X (2) Industrial

















Trust Balance Stakeholder Trust Score
Activity Inactive = 0%
Active = 4.5%
Very Active = 9%
Rating ∗ = 7.2%; ∗∗ = 14.4%;
∗∗∗ = 21.6%; ∗∗∗∗ = 28.8%;
∗∗∗∗∗ = 36%
Source Unknown (3) = 5.94%
Different Source (2) = 11.88%
Same Source (1) = 18%
Industry Other Industry = 18.5%
Same Industry = 37%
Rating Value
Figure 2: Trust taxonomy.
Nevertheless, the stakeholder is still vetted by the platforms
administrators. Open-source platforms, such as the Malware
Information Sharing Platform (MISP), rely on traditional
trust establishment in manual form, i.e., through personal
meetings or by being a member of a trusted circle. The
limitations of such trust processes are that cyber threat
intelligence is mostly shared behind closed doors. Therefore,
stakeholders may not get the maximum value out of the
information because of the limited circle of stakeholders.
Trust functionalities in threat intelligence platforms may
increase the participation and the shared information.
4.2. System Model. This subsection presents the system
model of the trust taxonomy accompanied by Figure 3.
The first attribute of the trust taxonomy is the trust
level in the source. This requires transparency pertaining to
the generation of the CTI, i.e., the whole life cycle of the
intelligence so far (Table 4).
The second attribute is the stakeholder rating. Stakehold-
ers may be rated by other stakeholders who received CTI.
The attributes may differ depending on the importance to
the rating stakeholder.These attributes may comprise quality,
timeliness, or communication (Table 5).
The third attribute is the sharing activitywhichmay reveal
free riders (Table 6).
The fourth attribute is the industry sector of the sharing
stakeholder (Table 7).
4.3. Trust Taxonomies Comparison. This section presents a
comparison of the mentioned trust taxonomies in Section 4.
The papers and schemes have been selected due to their
































Figure 3: Trust taxonomy system model.
Table 4: Trust in source.
Trust Level Trust Description




5 Very Low Trust




3 ∗ ∗ ∗ Moderate
4 ∗ ∗ ∗∗ Good
5 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ Excellent
Table 6: Stakeholder sharing activity.
Activity Description
Very Active Shared CTI in the past 7 days
Active Shared CTI in the past 30 days
Inactive Shared CTI more than 30 days ago
possible capability of being implemented in a cyber threat
intelligence sharing environment to establish or contribute
to a trusted environment.We summarized and compared the
taxonomies below.







A recommendation and authentication model was pre-
sented in “Research of P2PNetworkTrustModel (2013)” [20].
The model is based on trust and access control. It contributes
to the identification of nodes with malicious intent, such as
free riders.The nodes reputation is identified according to the
node’smalicious feedback behavior.The historical experience
attribute of the trustmodel is similar to our stakeholder rating
attribute of the trust taxonomy.Themodel evaluates whether
the transactionwas satisfactory and is then added to the peers
profile. In our model, the stakeholders may rate another peer
after a CTI record was shared. The missing control of the
authenticity of the rating is a limitation in our model.
A taxonomy was presented in “A Taxonomy for Securely
Sharing Information among Others in a Trusted Domain”
(2013) [21]. The taxonomy presents a decentralized trusted
environment for information sharing. It intends to prevent
the leakage of information and proving the foundation for
secure information sharing. The components to establish the
trusted domain are assets, policy, controls, roles, evidence,
and actions. The proposed trust domain has similar func-
tions compared to our stakeholder trust score where the
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stakeholder’s trust is evaluated through different attributes.
In CTI sharing, similar attributes may be relevant, fine-
tuned with our proposed set of attributes to establish a
trust score, i.e., sharing activity, stakeholder rating, same
source, and same industry. A reputationmodel was presented
in “A Taxonomy to Express Open Challenges in Trust
and Reputation Systems” (2012) [19]. The paper examines
the techniques used in reputation models and provides
an overview of problem areas and possible solutions. The
authors propose solutions for the lack of portability between
systems, lack of categorization and the ability to filter and
search, and explicit feedback, i.e., initialization, cold start,
and subjectivity. The paper’s overview of challenges in trust
and reputation systems is still present. The paper outlines the
initial phase of decentralized trust establishment. This issue
is reflected in our trust taxonomy when new participants join
the sharing groups and have to “earn” their trust.
A reputation model was presented in “Taxonomy of
Trust: Categorizing P2P Reputation Systems” (2006) [18].
The authors present various trust and reputation models to
build a trust taxonomy. A reputation scoring and ranking
model is presented which describes “inputs”, “outputs”, and
“peer selection”. Furthermore, incentives for encouragement
and punishments for malicious peers are presented. The
reputation scoring and rankingmodel defines “inputs” which
may be compared to the sharing activity attribute. Further-
more, it is discussed whether quality and quantity should
influence the trust score. Our model provides a sharing
activity attribute which reflects the quantity. The quality of
the CTI is evaluated through the stakeholder rating attribute.
“Output” comprises a scale from 1 to 10 andmay be compared
to the stakeholder rating. The authors discuss that different
functions may be applied to different trust situations.
4.4. Trust Taxonomy Threat Model. Our trust taxonomy has
been shown to be vulnerable against the following attacks.
(i) Collusion Attacks: stakeholders may form a group of
adversaries to rate each other positively or increase the shar-
ing activity to gain the trust of others. The adversaries may
use this vulnerability to decrease the stakeholder reputation
by giving poor ratings. For instance, malicious stakeholders
A, B, C, and D join a cyber threat intelligence sharing
community. The peers share and consume intelligence with-
out any negative occurrences in the first few months. At
the beginning, all stakeholders have low trust scores which
increase, decrease, or stay the same over time.The incentive is
that stakeholders with high trust scores have access to highly
critical information which may be labeled with green or
amber TLP.The previously mentioned peers start giving each
other high stakeholder ratings which contribute positively to
the trust score. The malicious peers had therefore access to
critical intelligence anduse the information to start exploiting
unfixed vulnerabilities. Another scenario may involve the
attack of specific stakeholders to decrease their reputation by
giving bad stakeholder ratings. This may result in access loss
to critical threat intelligence or complete loss of consumption.
Hence, the stakeholder would only be able to share his own
threat intelligence until the reputation is restored.
Possible solution: behavior monitoring may be able to
pick up certain anomalies in stakeholder behavior and alert
administrators to check suspicious stakeholders.
(ii) Sybil: a malicious stakeholder may create false iden-
tities to increase his own reputation. The incentive would
be to obtain access to higher classified cyber threat intel-
ligence for malicious purposes. For example, stakeholder
XYZ joined a threat intelligence community which uses our
trust taxonomy.The adversary uses several disposable e-mail
addresses to create fake users which allowed him to rate
himself higher. He then gained the trust of real stakeholders
to receive permission to access higher classified cyber threat
intelligence.
Possible solution: reference [22] developed a Sybil
attack prevention mechanism which focuses on the social
network domain. The mechanism is based on pairing based
cryptography which includes a challenge and a response
mechanism to join a group. This approach may be borrowed
and implemented into the cyber threat sharing environment
to protect the proposed trust taxonomy.
5. Case Studies
The presented trust taxonomy is tested through different
illustrative use case studies. Case studies 1 and 2 discuss a
fixed trust level. Case studies 3 and 4 discuss a dynamic
trust environment and how trust is managed. The threat
sharing community is called “X1”, contains currently 12,536
stakeholders from various industries, and uses the presented
trust taxonomy to enable a trusted environment. The reposi-
tory is not industry-specific, but circles of trust were created
supporting specific industries.
(i) Case Study 1: the organization “CFCyberX” has
recently joined the threat sharing community X1. Therefore,
stakeholder ratings are very low and comprise currently 3
reviews. The represented industry is the Automobile Sector.
The actionability of the submitted CTI fulfilled all attributes
to satisfaction. For example, the intelligence was submitted to
the repository in less than 1 hour of discovery; the Course of
Action (CoA)was accurately described for other stakeholders
to directly implement the remedy. Five different types of
information have been shared since registration 2 weeks ago.
Therefore, the sharing activity is set to active. CFCyberX
ensured transparency regarding where the intelligence was
generated. Four different CTIs were shared as self-generated
and 1 CTI was shared from another source.
This case study presents an ideal functioning state of
incipient trust where the organization CFCyberX has already
earned the limited trust of other stakeholders.
The identified risks with this case study are as follows:
due to its recent registration and few contributions, the
stakeholder may use this account to increase the rating of
another account. For example, good quality CTI is shared
to make other stakeholders believe in its good intentions.
The trust level may indicate that confidential CTI is shared
with the new stakeholder. If the stakeholder has malicious
intentions, then the shared information could be used against
the sharing peer, particularly if the vulnerability has not been
remedied yet.
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(ii) Case Study 2: this case study presents the financial
organization “QuickExchange” which sells and buys various
currencies. The organization joined X1 7 months ago and has
received moderate to negative ratings. 63 different types of
CTI have been shared with the community. For example, the
negative feedback is a result of poor communication after
sharing CTI and poor overall quality regarding timeliness.
The negative reviews from the community had the effect that
“QuickExchange” only has access to low risk CTI.
This case study demonstrates that trust may deteriorate
over time if negative feedback is continuously received.
Moreover, the continuation of low feedback may result in
being removed from the trust circle or will only be allowed
to provide CTI.
(iii) Case Study 3: the organization “CyberWhiteGoods”
produces electronic appliances which are connected to the
Internet. The sharing community X1 provides a trusted circle
of stakeholders that share specific IoT threats. The products
are very system specific and unique, and hence most vulner-
abilities are discovered in-house or by external penetration
testers. A bounty by “CyberWhiteGoods” is paid to white
hat hackers for every discovered vulnerability. Nevertheless,
data transfer is over traditional TCP/IP and data is stored
on servers in the cloud. Ergo, some traditional CTI, such as
information about server vulnerabilities and DDoS attacks, is
applicable.The organization has shared various CTIs over the
last 2 years since registration. The stakeholder’s trust level is
currently at 85%derived from criteria such as activity, ratings,
and industry sector. The reputation deteriorated below an
acceptable trust level because the account was temporarily
hacked by an adversary. The adversary tried to misuse the
consumed CTI to attack stakeholders at vulnerable points.
Stakeholders raised their concern that they were attacked
directly after critical information was shared with “X1”. This
had the effect that the organization was only allowed to
share but not consume CTI. After a thorough investigation,
the account was restored and permission given back to
“CyberWhiteGoods”. The trust level was restored to before
the attack. This cases study shows that if an account was
hijacked, access to critical information is given to the adver-
sary. Therefore, system critical information can be exploited
to attack unfixed vulnerabilities. It may also decrease the
stakeholder’s reputation even if the trust level is restored.The
stakeholder may not be trusted any more with critical CTI
because they may not be able to keep the shared information
safe.
(iv) Case Study 4: the UK based water supplier “Water-
Plus” joined “X1” 5 years ago and is part of the sharing
circle specific for threats to the water supply chain. The
stakeholders in the sharing circle represent different organi-
zations nationally and internationally. Information is shared
about cyber vulnerabilities but also about tangible attacks,
such as planned attacks on pipes or contamination of the
water supply. The sharing circle is highly interested in threats
from the dark web where cyber terrorists collude and may
reveal attacking details.The stakeholder has received positive
reviews and is a very active participant pertaining to its
amount of shared CTI. Nevertheless, it shares also third-
party intelligence from outside the sharing circle. This has
a negative impact on the trust level because the intelligence
source is unknown or not trusted.Moreover, the organization
has shared CTI with a nonmember which was discovered by
another stakeholder of the sharing circle. This led to a warn-
ing from the repository administration. Further breaches
would lead to a dismissal from the community.
This case study has shown sharing activities between
stakeholders of critical infrastructure systems. Not following
sharing policies such as sharing with third parties may be
detrimental to trust levels. Stakeholders may decide not to
share with “WaterPlus” if it shares CTI with peers outside the
trusted community.
5.1. Case Studies Evaluation. Four case studieswere presented
and the evaluation is based on each case study. At first, we
analyze key problems within each case study and why they
exist. Then, we analyze the impact on the stakeholders and
finally whether the proposed trust taxonomy is able to aid the
trust establishment.
(i) Case Study 1: the key problem with case study 1 is
that the stakeholder is a new peer in the trusted circle and
has little history of sharing. It may be challenging for new
peers to establish a trusted relationship at the beginning.This
is a common problem in information sharing frameworks
where trust has to be slowly created. This is not the case if a
vetting process is conducted before sharing commences. The
impact in this scenariomay be that the company “CFCyberX”
may not receive valuable threat intelligence that has a high
security label, such as TLP red or amber. This case study
may benefit from our proposed trust taxonomy by using
the rating system for the CTI sharing attributes. It can help
aid new stakeholders to establish trust after a few sets of
threat intelligence were shared. The positive rating of the
stakeholder may enable other trusted peers to share more
critical threat intelligence with the stakeholder.
(ii)Case Study 2: the key problemwith case study 2 is that
“QuickExchange” has shared poor quality threat intelligence,
did not communicate efficiently, and hence received negative
reviews from other peers. The reason for this behavior may
have 2 different reasons: deliberate or accidental. Deliberately
sharing low quality threat intelligence and not communicat-
ing with other peers may reveal the intention of free riding,
where CTI is consumed but not shared, or like in this case,
only low quality CTI is shared. Accidental may include that
in the sharers opinion the qualitywas sufficient. Furthermore,
the stakeholdermay not have the time and capacity to provide
high quality threat intelligence and communicate adequately
with other peers.The impactmay be that the stakeholder only
receives low quality threat intelligence in return and may be
excluded from receiving CTI at all until its ratings go up.The
benefit of the trust taxonomy for this case study is that free
riders may be located. Moreover, it may also aid in deciding
which threat intelligence is shared.
(iii) Case Study 3: the key problem with case study 3
differs from the previous 2 case studies where, in this case,
the account of “CyberWhiteGoods” was hacked. Therefore,
the user did not have control over the account and its actions.
The account suffered from a loss of trust during the hijack and
it took some time to prove that the attack really happened.
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Furthermore, it took the stakeholder some time to readjust
their trust level back to normal. Accounts may be hacked at
any time and attackers may deteriorate a stakeholder’s trust
level. The impact of this case study is that the stakeholder
did not have full access to critical threat intelligence during
the time of the attack and recovery. This may have been
damaging towards the proactive defense of the system.
Therefore, breaches that could have been prevented through
threat intelligence may have been successful. This case study
benefited from the trust taxonomy until the account hijack.
The trust taxonomy was unable to differentiate between
the real stakeholder and the hijacker. Therefore, the trust
taxonomy would profit from safety implemented to identify
whether the real stakeholder is in control.
(iv) Case Study 4: the key problem with this case study
is that “WaterPlus” shared third-party threat intelligence
without revealing where it emanated from. Moreover, the
stakeholder was caught sharing threat intelligence from the
sharing circle with a nonmember. This deteriorated the trust
level and a warning was issued. The reason for sharing
outside the trusted circle may be accidental or deliberate.
The accidental scenario would involve that the stakeholder
may not be well organized. The threat intelligence may have
been shared with a stakeholder outside the trusted circle,
because it was not clear where it originated from. A deliberate
scenario would involve that the stakeholder knew that it
was against the policy to share outside the trusted circle
but shared it anyway. The impact of such a behavior may
result in not receiving classified threat intelligence due to
the stakeholder’s misbehavior. The trust taxonomy can aid
the sharing stakeholders in the process to quickly identify
another peer’s trust level and hence decide which threat
intelligence to share. The trust taxonomy may not aid the
stakeholders in detecting anomalies that would cause trust
deterioration. This would have to be fed manually into the
trust taxonomy.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
Trust relationships between sharing stakeholders are imper-
ative to share cyber threat intelligence. Nevertheless, it is
challenging to find the right ingredients to establish a trusted
environment. 30 threat intelligence platforms/providers were
analyzed pertaining to trust functionalities. The trust taxon-
omy presented in this work demonstrates a way to estab-
lish trust for decentralized stakeholders. A threat model
described vulnerabilities in our trust taxonomy and possible
solutions to mitigate attacks. Illustrative case studies that
reflect real-world scenarios were developed and analyzed to
produce a testing environment for our trust taxonomy.
Future work includes the implementation with other
components of actionable cyber threat intelligence sharing,
for instance, threat intelligence relevance filtering for con-
sumption. Moreover, the implementation in a live envi-
ronment may provide our trust taxonomy with interesting
challenges and further insights.
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